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Paradox Lost?
Firm-level Evidence on the Returns to
Information Systems Spending
ABSTRACT
The "productivity paradox" of information systems (IS) is that, despite enormous
improvements in the underlying technology, the benefits of IS spending have not been
found in aggregate output statistics. One explanation is that IS spending may lead to
increases in product quality or variety which tend to be overlooked in aggregate output
statistics, even if they increase sales at the firm-level. Furthermore, the restructuring and
cost-cutting that are often necessary to realize the potential benefits of IS have only recently
been undertaken in many firms.
Our study uses new firm-level data on several components of IS spending for 1987-1991.
The dataset includes 367 large firms which generated approximately $1.8 trillion dollars in
output in 1991. We supplemented the IS data with data on other inputs, output, and price
deflators from other sources. As a result, we could assess several econometric models of
the contribution of IS to firm-level productivity.
Our results indicate that IS spending has made a substantial and statistically significant
contribution to firm output. We find that the gross marginal product (MP) for computer
capital averaged 81% for the firms in our sample. We find that the MP for computer capital
is at least as large as the marginal product of other types of capital investment and that,
dollar for dollar, IS labor spending generates at least as much output as spending on non-IS
labor and expenses. Because the models we applied were similar to those that have been
previously used to assess the contribution of IS and other factors of production, we
attribute the different results to the fact that our data set is more current and larger than
others explored. We conclude that the "productivity paradox" disappeared by 1991, at least
in our sample of firms.
1. INTRODUCTION
Spending on information systems (IS), and in particular information technology (IT)
capital, is widely regarded as having enormous potential for reducing costs and enhancing
the competitiveness of American firms. Although spending has surged in the past decade,
there is surprisingly little formal evidence linking it to higher productivity. Several studies,
such as those by Loveman (1994) and by Barua, Kriebel & Mukhopadhyay (1991) have
been unable to reject the hypothesis that computers add nothing at all to total output, while
others estimate that the marginal benefits are less than the marginal costs (Morrison and
Berndt 1990).
This "productivity paradox" has alarmed managers and puzzled researchers. American
corporations have spent billions of dollars on computers and many firms have radically
restructured their business processes to take advantage of computers. If these investments
have not increased the value produced or reduced costs, then management must rethink
their IS strategies. Roach (1987), who was among the first to identify the productivity
shortfall in the 1980s, is currently more optimistic about the current prospects for
productivity growth because many firms have finally begun to realize the potential labor
savings enabled by IT. However, because none of the previous estimates of IT
productivity were based on recent data, this hypothesis remains untested.
This study considers new evidence and finds sharply different results from previous
studies. Our dataset is based on five annual surveys of several hundred large firms for a
total of 1121 observations1 over the period 1987-1991. The firms in our sample generated
approximately $1.8 trillion dollars worth of gross output in the United States in 1991, and
their value-added of $630 billion accounted for about 13% of the 1991 US gross domestic
product of $4.86 trillion (Council of Economic Advisors, 1992). Because the identity of
each of the participating firms is known, we were able to supplement the IS data with data
from several other sources. As a result, we could assess several econometric models of the
contribution of IS to firm-level productivity.
Our examination of these data indicates that IS spending has made a substantial and
statistically significant contribution to the output of firms. Our point estimates indicate that,
dollar for dollar, spending on computer capital created more value than spending on other
types of capital. We find that the contribution of IS to output does not vary much across
1 An observation is one year of data on all variables for a specific firm. We did not have all five years of
data for every firm, but the data set does include at least one year of data for 367 different firms.
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years, although there is weak evidence of a decrease over time. We also find some
evidence of differences across various sectors of the economy. Technology strategy also
appears to affect returns. For instance, we find that neither firms that relied heavily on
mainframes nor firms which emphasized personal computer (PC) usage performed as well
as firms that invested in a mix of mainframes and PCs.
In each of the specifications we examine, estimates of the gross marginal product for
computers exceeds 50% annually. Considering a 95% confidence interval around our
estimates, we can reject the hypothesis that computers add nothing to total output.
Furthermore, several of our regressions suggest that the marginal product for computers is
significantly higher than the return on investment for other types of capital, although this
comparison is dependent on the assumed cost of computer capital. Overall, our findings
suggest that for our sample of large firms, the "productivity paradox" disappeared in the
1987-1991 period.
1.1 Previous research on IT and productivity
There is a broad literature on IT value which has been recently reviewed in detail elsewhere
(Brynjolfsson 1993; Wilson 1993). Many of these studies examined correlations between
IT spending ratios and various performance measures, such as profits or stock returns (Dos
Santos et al. 1993; Harris and Katz 1988; Strassmann 1990), and some found that the
correlation was either zero or very low, which has led to the conclusion that computer
investment has been unproductive. However, in interpreting these findings, it is important
to bear in mind that economic theory predicts that in equilibrium, companies that spend
more on computers would not, on average, have higher profitability or stock market
returns. Managers should be as likely to over-spend as to under-spend, so high spending
should not necessarily be "better". Where correlations are found, they should be
interpreted as indicating either an unexpectedly high or low contribution of information
technology, as compared to the performance that was anticipated when the investments
were made. Thus, perhaps counter-intuitively, the common finding of zero or weak
correlations between the percentage of spending allocated to IT and profitability do not
necessarily indicate a low payoff for computers.
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To examine the contribution of IT to output, it is helpful to work within the well-defined
framework of the economic theory of production. In fact, Alpar & Kim (1990) found that
methods based on production theory could yield insights that were not apparent when more
loosely constrained statistical analyses were performed. The economic theory of
production posits that the output of a firm is related to its inputs via a production function
and predicts that each input should make a positive contribution to output. A further
prediction of the theory is that the marginal cost of each input should just equal the marginal
benefit produced by that input. Hundreds of studies have estimated production functions
with various inputs, and the predictions of economic theory have generally been confirmed
(See Berndt, 1991, especially chapters 3 and 9, for an excellent review of many of these
studies).
The "productivity paradox" of IT is most accurately linked to a subset of studies based on
the theory of production which either found no positive correlation overall (Barua et al.
1991; Loveman 1994), or found that benefits fell short of costs (Morrison and Berndt
1990). Using the Management of the Productivity of Information Technology (MPIT)
database,2 Loveman (1994) concluded: "Investments in IT showed no net contribution to
total output". While his elasticity estimates ranged from -.12 to .09, most were not
statistically distinguishable from zero. Barua, Kriebel and Mukhudpadhyay (1991) found
that computer investments are not significantly correlated with increases in return on assets.
Similarly, Morrison and Berndt (1990) examined industry-level data using a production
function that controlled for changes in other inputs and found that each dollar spent on
"high tech" capital3 increased measured output by only 80 cents on the margin.
Although previous work provides little econometric evidence that computers improve
productivity, Brynjolfsson's (1993) review of the overall literature on this "productivity
paradox" concludes that the "shortfall of evidence is not necessarily evidence of a
shortfall." He notes that increases in product variety and quality should properly be
2 The database contains standard financial information, IT spending data and other economic measures such
as product prices and quality for 60 business units of 20 firms over the period 1978-1984. See Loveman
(1994) for a more detailed description.
3 The precise definition of "IT" varies from study to study. Morrison and Berndt included scientific
instruments, communications equipment, photocopiers and other office equipment as well as computers in
their definition. Others define IT even more broadly, including software, services and related peripheral
equipment. As described in section 2.3 below, the definition used in our study is fairly narrow and includes
separate estimates for the effect of corporate computer capital and corporate IS labor.
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counted as part of the value of output, but that the price deflators that the government
currently uses to remove the effects of inflation are imperfect. These deflators are
computed assuming that quality and other intangible characteristics do not change for most
goods. As a result, inflation is overestimated and real output is underestimated by an
equivalent amount (because real output is estimated by multiplying nominal output by the
price deflator). In addition, as with any new technology, a period of learning, adjustment
and restructuring may be necessary to reap its full benefits, so that early returns may not be
representative of the ultimate value of IT. Accordingly, he argues that "mismeasurement"
and "lags" are two of four viable explanations (along with "redistribution" and
"mismanagement") for the collected findings of earlier studies. This leaves the question of
computer productivity open to continuing debate.
1.2 Data Issues -
The measurement problem has been exacerbated by weaknesses in available data.
Industry-level output statistics have historically been the only data that are available for a
broad cross-section of the economy. In a related study using much of the same data as the
Morrison & Berndt (1990) study, Berndt and Morrison (1994) conclude, "...there is a
statistically significant negative relationship between productivity growth and the high-tech
intensity of the capital." However, they also point out: "it is possible that the negative
productivity results are due to measurement problems...". Part of the difficulty is that
industry-level data does allow us to distinguish firms within a particular industry which
invest heavily in IT from those with low IT investments. Comparisons can only be made
among industries, yet these comparisons can be sensitive to price deflators used, which in
turn depend on the assumptions about how much quality improvement has occurred in each
industry. Firm-level production functions, on the other hand, will better reflect the "true"
outputs of the firm, insofar as the increased sales at each firm can be directly linked to its
use of computers and other inputs, and all the firms are subject to the same industry-level
price deflator.
On the other hand, a weakness of firm-level data is that it can be painstaking to collect, and
therefore, studies with firm level data have historically focused on relatively narrow
samples. This has made it difficult to draw generalizable results from these studies. For
instance, Weill (1992) found some positive impacts for investments in some categories of
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IS but not for overall IS spending. However, the 33 strategic business units (SBUs) in his
sample from the valve manufacturing industry accounted for less than $2 billion in total
sales, and he notes, "The findings of the study have limited external validity." (Weill,
1992). By the same token, the Loveman (1994) and Barua, Kriebel and Mukhudpadhyay
(1991) studies were based on data from only 20 firms (60 SBUs) in the 1978-82 period
and derived only rather imprecise estimates of IT's relationship to firm performance.
The imprecision of previous estimates highlights an inherent difficulty of measuring the
benefits of IT investment. To better understand the perceived benefits, we conducted a
survey of managers to find out the relative importance of reasons for investing in IT.4 Our
results indicate that the primary reason for IT investment was customer service, followed
by cost savings. Close behind were timeliness and quality. In practice, the value of many
of the benefits of IT, other than cost savings, are not well captured in aggregate price
deflators or output statistics. 5
Given the weaknesses of existing data, it has been very difficult to distinguish the
contribution of IT from random shocks that affect productivity even when sophisticated
analytical methods are applied. As Simon (1984) has observed:
In the physical sciences, when errors of measurement and other noise are found to
be of the same order of magnitude as the phenomena under study, the response is
not to try to squeeze more information out of the data by statistical means; it is
instead to find techniques for observing the phenomena at a higher level of
resolution. The corresponding strategy for economics is obvious: to secure new
kinds of data at the micro level.
A convincing assessment of IS productivity would ideally employ a sample which included
a large share of the economy (as in the Berndt and Morrison studies), but at a level of detail
that disaggregated inputs and outputs for individual firms (as in Loveman (1994), Barua et
al. (1991), and Weill (1992)). Furthermore, because the recent restructuring of many firms
may have been essential to realizing the benefits of IS spending, the data should be as
current as possible. Lack of such detailed data has hampered previous efforts. While our
4 Further detail on the survey results is given in Brynjolfsson (1994).
5 No good methodology exists for incorporating some of the other benefits, such as variety. Baily and
Gordon (1988) estimate that "true" annual productivity growth might be as much as 0.5% higher overall
than reported in official statistics that do not account for most intangible benefits.
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paper applies essentially the same models as those used in earlier studies, we use new,
firm-level data which is more recent, more detailed and includes more companies. We
believe this accounts for our sharply different results.
1.3 Theoretical Issues
As discussed above, there are a number of hypotheses for explaining the productivity
paradox, including the possibility that it is an artifact of mismeasurement. We consider this
possibility in this paper.
More formally, we examine the following hypotheses using a variety of statistical tests:
Hi) The-output contributions of computer capital and IS staff labor are positive;
H2) The net output contributions of computer capital and IS staff labor are positive
after accounting for depreciation and labor expense respectively.
In our analysis, we build on a long research stream which applies production theory to
determine the contributions of various inputs to output.6 This approach uses economic
theory to determine the set of relevant variables and to define the structural relationships
among them. The relationship can then be estimated econometrically and compared with
the predictions of economic theory. In particular, for any given set of inputs, the maximum
amount of output that can be produced, according to the known laws of nature and existing
"technology", is determined by a production function. As noted by Berndt (1991), various
combinations of inputs can be used to produce a given level of output, so a production
function can be thought of as pages of a book containing alternative blueprints. This is
essentially an engineering definition, but business implications can be drawn by adding an
assumption about how firms behave, such as profit maximization or cost minimization.
Under either assumption, no inputs will be "wasted", so the only way to increase output
for a given production function is to increase at least one input.
The theory of production not only posits a relationship among inputs and output, but also
posits that this relationship may vary depending on particular circumstances. Many of
6 (Berndt 1991) lists over a hundred references on this approach and presents an excellent literature review.
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these differences can be explicitly modeled by a sufficiently general production function
without adding additional variables. For instance, it is common to assume that there are
constant returns to scale, but more general models will allow for increasing or decreasing
returns to scale. In this way, it is possible to see whether large firms are more or less
efficient than smaller firms. Other differences may have to do with the economic
environment surrounding the firm, and are not directly related to inputs. Such differences
are properly modeled as additional "control" variables. Depending on prices and desired
levels of output, different firms may choose different combinations of inputs and outputs,
but they will all adhere to the set defined by their production function. The neoclassical
economic theory of production has been fairly successful empirically, despite the fact that it
treats firms as "black boxes" and thus ignores history or details of the internal organization
of firms. Of course, in the real world, such factors can make a significant difference and
recent advances in the theory of the firm may enable them to be more rigorously modeled as
well.
To operationalize the theory for our sample, we assume that the firms in our sample
produce a quantity of OUTPUT (Q) via a production function (F), whose inputs are
COMPUTER CAPITAL (C), NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL (K), IS STAFF labor (S), and
OTHER LABOR AND EXPENSES (L).7 These inputs comprise the sum total of all spending
by the firm and all capitalized investment. Economists historically have not distinguished
computer capital from other capital, lumping them together as a single variable. Similarly,
previous estimates of production functions have not distinguished IS staff labor from other
types of labor and expenses. However, for our purposes, making this distinction will
allow us to directly examine hypotheses such as H1 and H2 above. We seek to allow for
fairly general types of influences by allowing for any type of environmental factors which
affect the business sector (j) in which the company operates and year (t) in which the
observation was made. 8,9 Thus, we can write:
7 Another common way to operationalize the theory is to use the production function to derive a "cost
function" which provides the minimum cost required for a given level of output. While cost functions have
some attractive features, they require access to firm-level price information for each input, which are data we
do not have.
8 A more complete model might include, in addition to these controls, other variables which may affect
output such as the organization's maturity in the use of IT or the degree of restructuring it has undergone.
We hope to explore such models in future research.
9 Lags of IT spending could also be incorporated into the production function. For our purposes we chose
not to because lagged spending is already included in IT capital stock, and the data set is too short to get
reasonable estimates of a more general lag structure.
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Q = F(C, K, S, L; j,t) (1)
Output and each of the input variables can be measured in either physical units or dollars.
If measured in dollar terms, the results will more closely reflect the ultimate objective of the
firm (profits, or revenues less costs). However, this approach requires the deduction of
inflation from the different inputs and outputs over time and in different industries. This
can be done by multiplying the nominal dollar value of each variable in each year by an
associated deflator to get the real dollar values. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, this
appproach will probably underestimate changes in product quality or variety since the
deflators are imperfect.
The amount of output that can be produced for a given unit of a given input is often
measured as the marginal product (MP) of the input, which can be interpreted as a rate of
return. When examining differences in the returns of a factor across firms or time periods,
it is important to control for the effects of changes in the other inputs to production. Since
the production function identifies both the relevant variables of interest as well as the
controls, the standard approach to conducting productivity analyses is to assume that the
production function, F, has some functional form, and then estimate its parameters
(Berndt, 1991, pp. 449-460).
The economic theory of production places certain technical constraints on the choice of
functional form, such as quasi-concavity and monotonicity (Varian 1992). In addition, we
observe that firms use multiple inputs in production, so the functional form should also
include the flexibility to allow continuous adjustment between inputs as the relative prices
of inputs change.1 0 Perhaps the simplest functional form that relates inputs to outputs and
is consistent with these constraints is the Cobb-Douglas specification, variants of which
have been used since 1896 (Bemdt, 1991). This specification is probably the most
common functional form used for estimating production functions and remains the standard
10 For instance, a simple linear relationship between inputs and outputs is ruled out by these constraints.
A linear production function implies that a firm will either use only the lowest cost input, or an
indeterminate mix of all inputs if the prices are exactly the same.
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for studies such as ours, which seek to account for output growth by looking at inputs and
other factors.1'
Q = ePOCPl1Kf2SP3L3 4 (2)
In this specification, 1 and f33 are the output elasticity of COMPUTER CAPITAL and
information systems staff (IS STAFF), respectively. 12 If the coefficients 0 - 4 sum to 1,
then the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. However, increasing or
decreasing returns to scale can also be modeled with the above function. The principal
restriction implied by the Cobb-Douglas form is that the elasticity of substitution between
factors is constrained to be equal to -1. This means that as the relative price of a particular
input increases, the amount of the input employed will decrease by a proportionate amount,
and the quantities of other inputs will increase to maintain the same level of output. As a
result, this formulation is not appropriate for determining whether inputs are substitutes or
complements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we describe the statistical
methodology and data of our study. The results are presented in section 3. In section 4,
we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results.
2. METHODS AND DATA
2.1 Estimating Procedures
The basic Cobb-Douglas specification is obviously not linear in its parameters. However,
by taking logarithms of equation (2) and adding an error term (), one can derive an
11 For instance, Hall (1993) introduces her Cobb-Douglas production function with the words: "...using the
by now standard growth accounting framework...".
12 Formally, the output elasticity of computers, EC, is defined as: E F C For our production
aCF
function, F, this reduces to: = L0CPPl- P4 2C = . The MP for computers is simply
aF aF CF F
the output elasticity multiplied by the ratio of output to computer input: MPC = - =-- = Ec-
dC AC FC C
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equivalent equation that can be estimated by linear regression. For estimation, we have
organized the equations as a system of five equations, one for each year:
Log Qi,87 = 187 +j + 13 Log Ci,87 + 132 Log Ki,87 + [3 Log Si,87 + 134 Log Li,87 + 887 (3a)
Log Qi,88 = 1388 +13j + 1 Log Ci, 88 + 32 Log Ki,88 + P3 Log Si,88 + 4 Log Li,88 + £88 (3b)
Log Qi,89 = 1389 +j + 13 Log Ci,89 + 32 Log Ki,89 + 3 Log Si,89 + 34 Log Li,89 + £89 (3c)
Log Qi,90o = 390 +j + 1 Log Ci,9o + 32 Log Ki,9o + 33 Log Si,90 + 34 Log Li,9o + £90 (3d)
Log Qi,91 = 91 +j + P1 Log Ci,9 1 + 2 Log Ki,91l + P3 Log Si,91 + 34 Log Li,91 + 891 (3e)
where: Q, C, K, S, L and 131-4 are as before
87, 88, 89, 90 and 91 index each year
j indexes each sector of the economy, and
i indexes each firm in the sample
While each individual equation is based on a cross-section of the data, by constraining the
coefficients on each factor to be equivalent in different years, time series variation in the
data will also be reflected in the estimates of the system as a whole. In fact, under the
assumption that the error terms in each equation are independently and identically
distributed, estimating this system of equations is equivalent to pooling the data and
estimating the parameters by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, it is likely that the
variance of the error term varies across years, and that there is some correlation between the
error terms across years. It is therefore possible to get more efficient estimates of the
parameters by using the technique of Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISUR). 13
As equations (3a) - (3e) are written, we have imposed the usual restriction that the
parameters are equal across the sample, which allows the most precise estimates of the
parameter values. We can also allow some or all of the parameters to vary over time or by
firm characteristics, although this additional information is generally obtained at the
expense of lowering the precision of the estimates. We will explore some of these
13 Sometimes also called IZEF, the iterated version of Zellner's efficient estimator, ISUR yields estimates
that are numerically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator (Berndt, 1991). The ISUR procedure
starts by estimating the coefficients by OLS to obtain an initial estimate of the error term covariance
matrix, and then iteratively refines this estimate until convergence is reached at minimum error. This
procedure implicitly corrects for serial correlation among the variables even when there are missing
observations for some firms in some years. More traditional methods of correcting for serial correlation in
panel data sets (Kmenta 1986) require complete data and do not perform well with short time dimensions.
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alternative specifications in the results section; however, the main results of this paper are
based on the system of equations shown in (3a)-(3e).
2.2 Data Sources and Variable Construction
This study employs a unique data set on IS spending by large U.S. firms which was
compiled by International Data Group (IDG). The information is collected in an annual
survey of IS managers at large firms 14 that has been conducted since 1987. Respondents
are asked to provide the market value of central processors (mainframes, minicomputers,
supercomputers) used by the firm in the U.S., the total central IS budget, the percentage of
the IS budget devoted to labor expenses, the number of PCs and terminals in use, and other
IT related information.
Since the names of the firms are known and most of them are publicly traded, the IS
spending information from the IDG survey could be matched to Standard and Poors'
Compustat II15 to obtain measures of output, capital investment, expenses, number of
employees and industry classification. In addition, these data were also combined with
price deflators for output, capital, employment costs, expenses and IT capital.
There is some discretion as to how the years are matched between the survey and
Compustat. The survey is completed at the end of the year for data for the following year.
Since we are primarily interested in the value of computer capital stock, and the survey is
timed to be completed by the beginning of the new fiscal year, we interpret the survey data
as a beginning of period value, which we then match to the end of year data on Compustat
(for the previous period). This also allows us to make maximum use of the survey data
and is the same approach used by IDG for their reports based on these data (e.g. Maglitta
and Sullivan-Trainor, 1991).16
14Specifically, the survey targets Fortune 500 manufacturing and Fortune 500 service firms that are in the
top half of their industry by sales (see Table 2a).
15 Compustat II provides financial and other related information for publicly traded firms, primarily obtained
through annual reports and regulatory filings.
16lhis matching procedure may be sensitive to possible reverse causality between output and IS Labor as is
shown by our Hausman test in table 6.
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IDG reports the "market value of central processors" (supercomputers, mainframes and
minicomputers) but only the total number of "PCs and terminals". Therefore, the variable
for COMPUTER CAPITAL was obtained by adding the "market value of central processors"
to an estimate of the value of PCs and terminals, which was computed by multiplying the
weighted average value for PCs and terminals by the number of PCs and terminals.17 This
approach yields roughly equal values, in aggregate, for central processors ($33.0 Bn) as
for PCs and terminals ($30.4 Bn) in 1991. These values were corroborated by a separate
survey by International Data Corporation (IDC 1991) which tabulates shipments of
computer equipment by category. This aggregate computer capital is then deflated by the
computer systems deflator reported in Gordon (1993).
The variables for IS STAFF, NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE and OUTPUT were computed
by multiplying the relevant quantity from the IDG survey or Compustat by an appropriate
government price deflator. IS STAFF was computed by multiplying the IS Budget figure
from the IDC survey by the "percentage of the IS budget devoted to labor expenses...",
and deflating this figure. NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE was computed by deflating total
expense and subtracting deflated IS STAFF from this value. Thus, all the expenses of a
firm are allocated to either IS STAFF or NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE.
Total capital for each firm was computed from book value of capital stock, adjusted for
inflation by assuming that all investment was made at a calculated average age (total
depreciation/current depreciation) of the capital stock. 18 From this total capital figure, we
subtract the deflated value of COMPUTER CAPITAL to get NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL.
Thus, all capital of a firm is allocated to either COMPUTER CAPITAL or NON-COMPUTER
CAPITAL. The approach to constructing total capital follows the methods used by other
authors who have studied the marginal product of specific production factors using a
similar methodology (Hall, 1990; Mairesse & Hall, 1993).
17 Specifically, we estimated the value of terminals and the value of PCs and then weighted them by the
proportion of PCs versus terminals. For terminals, the we estimated the value as the average list price of
an IBM 3151 terminal in 1989 which is $609 (Pelaia 1993). For PCs we used the average nominal PC
cost over 1989-1991 of $4,447, as reported in Berndt & Griliches (1990). These figures were then weighted
by the proportion of PCs to terminals in the 1993 IDG survey (58% terminals). The resulting estimate
was .42*$609 + .58* $4,447 = $2,835.
1 8An alternative measure of capital stock was computed by converting historical capital investment data
into a capital stock using the Winfrey S-3 table. This approach was used in earlier versions of this paper
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1993), with similar results. However, the calculation shown above is more
consistent with previous research (see e.g. (Hall, 1993)).
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The firms in this sample are quite large. Their average sales over the sample period were
nearly $7.4 billion. However, in many other respects, they are fairly representative of the
US economy as a whole. For instance, their computer capital stock averages just over 2%
of total sales, or about $155 million, which is roughtly consistent with the capital flow
tables for the US economy published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Similarly, the
average IS budget as a share of sales was very close to the figure reported in a distinct
survey by CSC/Index (Quinn et al. 1993). A summary of the sources, construction
procedure and deflator for each variable is provided in Table 1, and sample statistics are
shown in Tables 2a and 2b.
2.3 Potential Data Problems
There are a number of possible errors in the data, either as a result of errors in source data
or inaccuracies introduced by the data construction methods employed. First, the IDG data
on IS spending are largely self-reported and therefore the accuracy depends on the diligence
of the respondents. Some data elements require a degree of judgment -- particularly the
market value of central processors and the total number of PCs and terminals. Also, not all
companies responded to the survey, and even those that did respond in one year may not
have responded in every other year. This may result in sample selection bias. For
instance, high performing firms (or perhaps low performing firms) may have been more
interested in participating in the survey.
However, the effect of the potential errors discussed above will probably be small. The
information is reasonably consistent from year to year for the same firm, and we have
checked the aggregate values against other independent sources. We used a different,
independent source (Compustat) for our output measures and for our non-IT variables
eliminating the chance of respondent bias for these measures. We also examined whether
the performance of the firms in our sample (as measured by return on equity (ROE) differ
from the population of the largest half of Fortune 500 Manufacturing and Fortune 500
Service finns. Our results indicate that there are no statistically significant differences
between the ROE of firmns in our sample and those that are not (t-statistic = .7), which
suggests that our sample is not disproportionately comprised of "strong" or "weak" firms.
Furthermore, the average size of the firms of our sample is not significantly different from
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the average size of firms in the top half of the Fortune 500 listings (t-statistic=.8).
Finally, the response rate of the sample is relatively high at over 75%, suggesting that
sample selection bias is probably not driving the results.
Second, there are a number of reasons why IS STAFF and COMPUTER CAPITAL may be
understated, although by construction these errors do not reduce total capital and total
expense for the firm. The survey is restricted to central IS spending in the US plus PCs
and terminals both inside and outside the central department. Some firms may have
significant expenditures on information systems outside the central department or outside
the US. In addition, the narrow definitions of IS spending employed in this study may
exclude significant costs that could be legitimately counted as COMPUTER CAPITAL such as
software and communication networks. Furthermore, by including only the labor portion
of IS expenses in IS STAFF as a separate variable (in order to prevent double counting of
capital expenditure), other parts of the IS budget are left in the NON-IS LABOR AND
EXPENSE category. The effects of these problems on the final results are discussed in the
Results section, especially section 3.4.
A third area of potential inaccuracy comes from the price deflators. Numerous authors
(Baily & Gordon, 1988; Siegel & Griliches, 1991) have criticized the current methods
employed by the BEA for constructing industry-level price deflators. It has been argued
that these methods substantially underestimate quality change or other intangible product
improvements. If consumer purchases are in part affected by intangible quality
improvements, the use of firm level data should provide a closer approximation to the true
output of a firm, because firms which provide quality improvement will have higher sales
and can be directly compared to firms in the same industry.
Finally, the measurement of OUTPUT and COMPUTER CAPITAL input in certain service
industries appeared particularly troublesome. For financial services, we found that
OUTPUT was poorly predicted in our model, presumably because of problems in defining
and quantifying the output of financial institutions. In the telecommunications industry, it
has been argued (Popkin 1992) that many of the productivity gains have come from very
large investments in computer-based telephone switching gear, which is primarily classified
as communications equipment and not COMPUTER CAPITAL, although it may be highly
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correlated with measured computer capital. We therefore excluded all firms in the financial
services industries (SIC60 - SIC69), and telecommunications (SIC48).19
3. RESULTS
3.1 Basic results
The basic estimates for this study are obtained by estimating the system of equations (3a)-
(3e) by ISUR (see section 2.1). Note that we allow the intercept term to vary across
sectors and years.
As reported in column 1 of Table 3, our estimate of P1 indicates that COMPUTER CAPITAL
is correlated with a statistically significant increase in OUTPUT. Specifically, we estimate
that the elasticity of output for COMPUTER CAPITAL is 0.0169 when all the other inputs
are held constant. Because COMPUTER CAPITAL accounted for an average of 2.09% of the
value of output each year, this implies a gross MP (increase in dollar output per dollar of
capital stock ) for COMPUTER CAPITAL of approximately 81% per year. 20 In other words,
an additional dollar of computer capital stock is associated with an increase in output of 81
cents per year on the margin. 21
The estimate for the output elasticity for IS STAFF was 0.0178, which indicates that each
dollar spent here is associated with a marginal increase in OUTPUT of $2.62. The
surprisingly high return to information systems labor may reflect systematic differences in
human capital,2 2 since IS staff are likely to have more education than other workers. The
high return may partially explain Krueger's (1991) finding that workers who use
computers are paid a wage premium.
19 The impact of these changes in both cases was to lower the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL slightly as
compared to the results on the full sample.
F
20 As noted in footnote 12, supra, MPC = E -, which in this case is .0169/.0209 = .8086 or about 81%.
cc
21 It is worth noting that our approach provides estimates of the marginal product of each input: how much
the last dollar of stock or flow added to output. In general, infra-marginal investments have higher rates of
return than marginal investments, so the return to the first dollar invested in computers is likely to be even
higher than the marginal returns we reported.
22 We thank Dan Sichel for pointing this out.
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The above estimates strongly support hypothesis Hi, that the contribution of IT is positive.
The t-statistics for our estimates of the elasticity of COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF are
3.92 and 3.38, respectively, so we can reject the null hypothesis of zero contribution of IT
at the 0.001 (two-tailed) confidence level for both. We can also reject the joint hypothesis
that they are both equal to zero (2(2)=43.9, p<.0001).
To assess H2 (that the contribution of IT is greater than its cost) it is necessary to estimate
the cost of COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF. After these costs are subtracted from the
gross benefits reported above, we can then assess whether the remaining "net" benefits are
positive. Because IS STAFF is a flow variable, calculating net benefits is straightforward:
a dollar of IS STAFF costs one dollar, so the gross marginal product of $2.62 implies a net
marginal product of $1.62. For IS STAFF, we can reject the null hypothesis that the
returns equal costs in favor of the hypothesis that returns exceed costs at the .05 confidence
level (X 2 (1)=4.4, p<.035).
Assessing H2 for COMPUTER CAPITAL, which is a stock variable, requires that we
determine how much of the capital stock is "used up" each year and must be replaced just to
return to the level at the beginning of the year. This is done by multiplying the annual
depreciation23 rate for computers by the capital stock in place. According to the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, the average service life of "Office, Computing and Accounting
Machinery" is seven years (Bureau of Economic Analysis 1987). If a seven year service
life for computer capital is assumed, then the above gross marginal product should be
reduced by subtracting just over 14% per year, so that after seven years the capital stock
will be fully replaced. This procedure yields a net marginal of 67%. However, a more
conservative assumption is that COMPUTER CAPITAL (in particular PCs) could have an
average service life as short as 3 years, which implies that the net rate of return should be
reduced by 33%. This would yield a net MP estimate of 48%. In either case, we can reject
the null hypothesis that the net marginal returns to computers are zero (p < .01).
However, it should be noted that the full cost of computers involves other considerations
than just the decline in value of the asset itself. For instance, calculating a Jorgensonian
23 Technically, "negative capital gains" may be a more accurate term than "depreciation", since computer
equipment is more likely to be replaced because of the arrival of cheaper, faster alternatives than because it
simply wears out.
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cost of capital (Christensen and Jorgenson 1969) would also attempt to account for the
effects of taxes, adjustment costs and capital gains or losses, in addition to depreciation
costs. On the other hand, firms invest in IT at least partly to move down the learning curve
(Brynjolfsson, 1993) or create options (Kambil, Henderson & Mohsenzadeh, 1993), and
these effects may create "assets" offsetting some of the losses to depreciation. The high
gross marginal product of COMPUTER CAPITAL suggests that if the total annual cost of
COMPUTER CAPITAL were as much as 40%, its net marginal product would be greater than
zero by a statistically significant amount.
An alternative approach to assessing H2 is to consider the opportunity cost of investing in
COMPUTER CAPITAL or IS STAFF. A dollar spent in either of these areas could have
generated a gross return of over 6% if it had instead been spent on NON-COMPUTER
CAPITAL or a net return of 7% if it were spent on OTHER LABOR AND EXPENSE. In this
interpretation, there are only excess returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL or IS STAFF if the
returns exceed the return of the respective non-IS component.
As shown in Table 6, we can reject the hypothesis that the net MP for COMPUTER
CAPITAL is equal to the MP for NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL, assuming a service life of as
little as 3 years for COMPUTER CAPITAL (and none in NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL) at the
.05 confidence level. Similarly, we can reject the hypothesis that IS STAFF generates the
same returns as spending on OTHER LABOR AND EXPENSE (p < .05).
Our confidence in the regression taken as a whole is increased by the fact that the estimated
output elasticities for the other, non-IT, factors of production were all positive and each
was consistent not only with economic theory (i.e. they imply a real rate of return on non-
IT factors of 6%-7%), but also with estimates of other researchers working with similar
data (e.g. Hall, 1993; Loveman, 1994). Furthermore, the elasticities summed to just over
one, implying constant or slightly increasing returns to scale overall, which is consistent
with the estimates of aggregate production functions by other researchers (Berndt, 1991).
The R 2 hovered around 99%, indicating that our independent variables could "explain"
most of the variance in output.
Our results suggest that during the 1987-1991 time period, firms could have created more
value if they had spent more on computer capital and labor and less on non-computer
Page 17
Evidence on the Returns IS
capital and labor than they actually did. In the conclusion section, we discuss some
reasons why managers may have made decisions which, with the benefit of hindsight,
appear to have been sub-optimal. First, however, we will further analyze the robustness of
our results.
3.2 What factors affect the rates of return for computers?
The estimates described above were based on the assumption that the parameters did not
vary over time, in different sectors, or across different subsamples of firms. Therefore,
they should be interpreted only as overall averages. However, by using the multiple
equations approach, it is also possible to address questions like: "Has the return to
computers been consistently high, or did it vary over time?" and "Have some sectors of the
economy had more success in using computers?" We address these questions by allowing
the parameters to vary by year or by sector.
Economic theory predicts that managers will increase investments in any inputs that achieve
higher than normal returns, and that as investment increases, marginal rates of return
eventually fall to normal levels. This pattern is supported by our findings for COMPUTER
CAPITAL, which exhibited higher levels of investment (Figure 2) and lower returns over
time (Figure 3). We find that the rates of return are fairly consistent over the period 1987-
1989 and then drop in 1990-1991. We can reject the null hypothesis of equality of returns
over time in the full sample (2(4)=1 1.2, p<.02). Nonetheless, even at the end of the
period, the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL still exceed the returns to NON-COMPUTER
CAPITAL. However, these results should be interpreted with caution since they are
particularly sensitive to sample changes and time-specific exogenous events such as the
1991 recession. 24
Roach (1987) has argued that the service sector uses computers much less efficiently than
manufacturing and points to aggregate statistics which report higher overall productivity
growth for manufacturing than for services. Our data set allows us to reconsider this claim
in light of more disaggregated data. The marginal products of COMPUTER CAPITAL across
sectors are presented in Figure 4. The marginal product (ignoring the mining sector which
2 4 A decline in the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL between 1989 and 1990 is also evident in a balanced
panel of 201 firms in the sample for 1989-1991.
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includes only 10 firms and has a large standard error) varies from 10% in transportation
and utilities to 127% in non-durable manufacturing. While there have been some
suggestions that reorganizing service processes around a "factory" model may help services
achieve productivity gains comparable to manufacturing, we cannot confirm that the
differences in measured returns are due to fundamental differences, or simply "noise" in the
data. Although the returns to computers in durable and non-durable manufacturing are as
high or higher than the returns in any other sector, we are unable to reject the hypothesis
that these rates of return are the same across most sectors due to the imprecision of the
estimates (without mining, X2(4)=6.6, p<.16).
A second area that can be addressed by our data and method is technology strategy. We
have already found that firms with more computer capital will, ceteris paribus, have higher
sales than firms with less computer capital, but do the types of computer equipment
purchased make a difference? We have data on two categories of equipment: 1) central
processors, such as mainframes, and 2) PCs and terminals. For this analysis, we divide
the sample into three equal groups based on the ratio of central processor value to PCs and
terminals. We find that the rate of return is highest for firms using a more balanced mix of
PCs and mainframes (Table 4), and lower for firms at either extreme. One interpretation of
this finding is that an IS strategy which relies too heavily on one category of equipment and
users will be less effective than a more even-handed approach which allows a better
"division of labor".
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis and Possible Biases - Econometric Issues
Our estimates of the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL required that a number of assumptions
be made about the econometric specification and the construction of the data set. This
section and the following section explore the validity of our assumptions and generally find
that the results are robust.
The econometric assumptions required for ISUR to produce unbiased estimates of both the
parameters and the standard errors are similar to those for OLS: the error term must be
uncorrelated with the regressors (inputs) and homoskedastic in the cross section. 2 5 ISUR
25 Note that if we had used OLS, further assumptions would be required: that all error terms are independent
and constant variance over time.
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implicitly corrects for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity over time in our formulation,
so that additional restrictions on the error structure are not necessary. Nonetheless, we
computed single-year OLS estimates both with and without heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors to examine whether heteroskedasticity is an issue for the cross-section. The
standard error estimates were within 10-20% of each other, indicating that
heteroskedasticity does not appear to be a problem. To test normality of the error terms,
we computed and plotted residuals from the basic specification, and found them to be
roughly normally distributed. It should be noted that even if these assumptions were
violated, the coefficient estimates (even for OLS) would still be unbiased and consistent
(although the estimated standard error would be incorrect).
However, the assumption that the error term is uncorrelated with the inputs (orthogonality)
is potentially an issue. One way in which this assumption could be violated is if the
causality is reversed: instead of increases in purchases of inputs (e.g. computers) leading
to higher output, an increase in output could lead to further investment (for example, a firm
spends the proceeds from an unexpected increase in demand on more computer
equipment). In this case, the assumptions for ISUR are violated since the inputs are not
predetermined, and therefore the error term is likely to be correlated with them. The
orthogonality assumption can also be violated if the input variables are measured with
error. The direction of bias of the coefficients from measurement error is dependent on
both the correlation between the variables as well as the correlation between measurement
errors (see Kmenta (1986) for a complete discussion).2 6
Regardless of the source of the error, it is possible to correct for the potential bias using
instrumental variables methods, or two-stage least squares (2SLS). This method employs
instrumental variables to filter out the endogenous variation and error in the variables,
which then allows consistent estimation of the parameters. We use once-lagged values of
variables as instruments, since by definition they cannot be associated with unanticipated
shocks in the dependent variable in the following year.2 7 Table 5 reports a comparison of
pooled OLS estimates with 2SLS estimates and shows that the coefficient estimates are
26 If an input variable is systematically understated by a constant multiplicative factor, then the coefficient
estimates would be unchanged.
27 However, in the presence of individual firm effects, lagged values are not valid instruments. While we
did not test for firm effects, we suspect they may be important, and so the results of our 2SLS estimates
should be interpreted with caution.
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similar although somewhat higher for COMPUTER CAPITAL and lower for IS STAFF. In
both cases the standard errors were substantially larger, as is expected when instrumental
variables are used. Using a Hausman specification test, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the regressors (see bottom of Table 5 for
test statistics), and therefore do not reject our initial specification.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Possible Biases - Data Issues
To further explore the robustness of our results, we examined impact of the possible data
errors discussed in section 2.3 that can be tested: 1) error in the valuation of PCs and
terminals, 2) errors in the price deflators, and 3) understatement or misclassification of
computer capital .
To assess the sensitivity of the results to possible errors in the valuation of PCs and
terminals, we recalculated the basic regressions varying the assumed average PC and
terminal value from $0 to $6K. Note that as the assumed value of PCs and terminals
increases, the increase in COMPUTER CAPITAL will be matched by an equal decrease in
NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL, which is calculated as a residual. Interestingly, as shown in
Figure 5, the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL in the basic regression is not very sensitive to
the assumed value of PCs and terminals, ranging from 77% if they are not counted to 59%
if PCs and terminals are counted at $6K. The reason the return rises at first when PCs and
terminals are counted as part of COMPUTER CAPITAL is presumably that firms with large
investments in PCs and terminals have higher output than similar firms without such
investments. Initially, this increased output raises the estimated elasticity of COMPUTER
CAPITAL (the numerator of MP) by more than the assumed costs of PCs and terminals (the
denominator), and therefore the estimated return to computers increases.
A second contribution to error is the understatement of output due to errors in the price
deflators. While it is difficult to directly correct for this problem, we estimated the basic
equations year by year, so that errors in the relative deflators would have no impact on the
elasticity estimates. The estimated marginal products ranged from 109% to 197% in the
individual year regressions versus 81% when all five years were estimated simultaneously.
The standard error on the estimates was significantly higher for all estimates, which can
account for the greater range of estimates. Overall, this suggests that our basic findings are
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not a result of the assumed price deflators. However, if the price deflators systematically
underestimate the value of intangible product change over time or between firms, our
measure of output will be understated, implying that the actual return for computer capital is
higher than our estimates.
To assess the third source of error, possible understatement or misclassification of
computer capital, we consider three cases: 1) hidden computer spending exists, but does
not show up elsewhere in the data, 2) hidden computer spending exists and shows up in
the "NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE" category, or 3) hidden computer spending exists and
shows up in the "OTHER CAPITAL" category. If the hidden IS costs do not show up
elsewhere in the firm (e.g. software development or training costs from previous years),
then the effect on the estimated returns is dependent on how closely correlated these costs
are to our measured COMPUTER CAPITAL. If they are uncorrelated, our estimate for the
elasticity and the return to COMPUTER CAPITAL is unbiased. If the missing costs are
perfectly correlated with the observed costs, then, because of the logarithmic form of our
specification, they will result only in a multiplicative scaling of the variables, and the
estimated elasticities and the estimated standard error will be unchanged.2 8 For the same
reason, the sign and statistical significance of our results for the returns to COMPUTER
CAPITAL and IS STAFF will also be unaffected. However, the denominator used for the
MP calculations will be affected by increasing computer capital so the estimated MP will be
proportionately lower or higher. For instance, if the hidden costs lead to a doubling of the
true costs of computer capital, then the true MP would fall from 81% to just over 40%.
Finally, if the hidden costs are negatively correlated with the observed costs, then the true
returns would be higher than our estimates.
A second possible case is that hidden IS capital expenses (e.g. software) show up in the
NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE category. To estimate the potential impact of these
omissions, we estimate the potential size of the omitted misclassified IS capital relative to
COMPUTER CAPITAL using data from another IDG survey (IDC 1991) on aggregate IS
expenditures, including software as well as hardware. To derive a reasonable lower bound
on the returns to COMPUTER CAPITAL, we assume that the misclassified IS capital had an
28 This is because multiplicative scaling of a regressor in a logarithmic specification will not change the
coefficient estimate or the standard error. All the influence of the multiplier will appear in the intercept
term which is not crucial to our analysis.
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average service life of three years, and further make the worst-case assumption of perfect
correlation between misclassified IS capital and COMPUTER CAPITAL (and reduce
proportionally the amount of NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE). In this scenario, our
estimates for the amount of COMPUTER CAPITAL in firms roughly doubles, yet the rates of
return are little unchanged from the basic analysis that does not include misclassified IS
capital (68% vs. 81%). This surprising result appears to be due to the fact that the return
on NON-IS LABOR AND EXPENSE is at least as high as the return on COMPUTER CAPITAL,
so moving costs from one category to another does not change overall returns much.
Alternatively, a third possible case is that the hidden IS capital expenditures show up in
OTHER CAPITAL. This would apply to items such as- telecommunications hardware which
would normally be classified as a capital expenditure. In this case, the marginal product of
COMPUTER CAPITAL will be reduced proportionally to the amount of the misclassification.
Intuitively, this case is similar to the case discussed earlier in which the hidden costs are
perfectly correlated with measured costs but do not appear elsewhere. To confirm this
result, we recalculated the regression assuming that missing capital costs were as much as
100% the amount of measured computer capital under the worst-case assumption that the
misclassified capital was perfectly correlated with the measured capital. The elasticities for
both capital components change less than 5% as the amount of misclassified capital was
varied.
Irrespective of these sensitivity calculations, it should be noted that the definition of
COMPUTER CAPITAL used in this study was fairly narrow and did not include items such
as telecommunications equipment, scientific instruments, or networking equipment. The
findings should be interpreted accordingly and do not necessarily apply to broader
definitions of IT. However, to the extent that the assumptions of our sensitivity analysis
hold, the general finding that IT contributes significantly to output is robust (Hi), although
the actual point estimates of marginal product may vary. Depending on the magnitude of
the error and the assumed cost of computer capital, mismeasurement could lead to the
conclusion that there are no differences in net marginal product between computer capital
and other capital.
On balance, we may have underestimated both IS input and final output. The directions of
the resulting biases go in opposite directions, but under reasonable assumptions they do not
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appear to obviate the basic finding that the return on IS capital and labor spending is
statistically significant and exceeds that of other types of capital and labor.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Comparison with earlier research
Although we found that computer capital and IS labor increase output significantly under a
variety of formulations (see summary table 7), several other studies have failed to find
evidence that IT increases output. Because the models we used were similar to those used
by several previous researchers, we attribute our different findings primarily to the larger
and more recent data set we used. Specifically, there are at least three reasons why our
results may differ from previous results.
First, we examined a later time period, (1987-1991), than did Loveman (1978-1982),
Barua et al. (1978-1982) or Berndt & Morrison (1968-1986). The massive build-up of
computer capital is a relatively recent phenomenon. Indeed, the delivered amount of
computer power in the companies in our sample is likely to be at least an order of
magnitude greater than that in comparable firms from the period studied by the other
authors. Brynjolfsson (1993) argues that even if the MP of IT were twice that of non-IT
capital, its impact on output in the 1970s or early 1980s would not have been large enough
to be detected with available data by conventional estimation procedures. Furthermore, the
changes in business processes needed to realize the benefits of IT may have taken some
time to implement, so it is possible that the actual returns from investments in computers
were initially fairly low. In particular, computers may have initially created organizational
slack which was only recently eliminated, perhaps hastened by the increased attention
engendered by earlier studies that indicated a potential productivity shortfall and
suggestions that "to computerize the office, you have to reinvent the office" (Thurow
1990). Apparently, an analogous period of organizational redesign was necessary to
unleash the benefits of electric motors (David, 1989).
A pattern of low initial returns is also consistent with the strategy for optimal investment in
the presence of learning-by-using: short-term returns should initially be lower than returns
for other capital, but subsequently rise to exceed the returns to other capital, compensating
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for the "investment" in learning (Lester & McCabe, 1993). Under this interpretation, our
high estimates of computer MP indicate that businesses are beginning to reap rewards from
the experimentation and learning phase in the early 1980s.
Second, we were able to use different and more detailed firm-level data than had been
available before. We argue that the effects of computers in increasing variety, quality or
other intangibles are more likely to be detected in firm level data than in the aggregate data.
Unfortunately, all such data, including ours, is likely to include data errors. It is possible
that the data errors in our sample happened to be more favorable (or less unfavorable) to
computers than those in other samples. We attempted. to minimize the influence of data
errors by cross-checking with other data sources, eliminating outliers, and examining the
robustness of the results to different subsamples and specifications. In addition, the large
size of our sample, should, by the law of large numbers, mitigate the influence of random
disturbances. Indeed, the precision of our estimates was generally much higher than those
of previous studies; the statistical significance of our estimates owes as much to the tighter
confidence bounds as to higher point estimates.
Third, our sample consisted entirely of relatively large "Fortune 500" firms. It is possible
that the high IS contribution we find is limited to these larger firms. However, an earlier
study, (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994)],found evidence that smaller firms may benefit
disproportionately from investments in information technology. In any event, because
firms in the sample accounted for a large share of the total US output, the economic
relevance of our findings is not heavily dependent on extrapolation of the results to firms
outside of the sample.
4.2 Managerial Implications
If the spending on computers is correlated with significantly higher returns than spending
on other types of capital, it does not necessarily follow that companies should increase
spending on computers. The firms with high returns and high levels of computer
investment may differ systematically from the low performers in ways that cannot be
rectified simply by increasing spending. For instance, recent economic theory has
suggested that "modern manufacturing", involving high intensity of computer usage, may
require a radical change in organization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). This possibility is
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emphasized in numerous management books and articles (see, e.g. Malone & Rockart,
1991; Scott Morton, 1991) and supported in our discussions with managers, both at their
firms and during a workshop on IT and Productivity attended by approximately 30 industry
representatives. 2 9
Furthermore, our results showing a high gross marginal product may be indicative of the
differences between computer investment and other types of investment. For instance,
managers may perceive IS investment as riskier than other investments, and therefore
require higher expected returns to compensate for the increased risk. Finally, IS is often
cited as an enabling technology which does not just produce productivity improvements for
individuals, but provides benefits by facilitating business process redesign or improving
the ability of groups to work together. In this sense, our results may be indicative of the
substantial payoffs to reengineering and other recent business innovations.
5. CONCLUSION
We examined data which included over 1000 observations on output and several inputs at
the firm level for 1987-1991. The firms in our sample had aggregate sales of over $1.8
trillion in 1991 and thus account for a substantional share of the U.S. economy. We tested
a broad variety of specifications, examined several different subsamples of the data, and
validated the assumptions of our econometric procedures to the extent possible.
The data indicate that COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF spending contribute significantly
to firm level OUTPUT. Furthermore, we were able to reject the hypothesis that the (gross)
MP for COMPUTER CAPITAL was equal to the MP for NON-COMPUTER CAPITAL in favor
of the hypothesis that the MP for COMPUTER CAPITAL was higher. When we adjusted for
depreciation using the BEA 7-year service life assumption for COMPUTER
CAPITAL, the differences in marginal product are still significant, suggesting the possibility
of excess returns to computer spending. The basic result that COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS
STAFF contribute significantly to total output are robust to reasonable assumptions about
measurement error due to exclusion of unmeasured factors. However, the evidence of
excess returns is not as strong, and the null hypothesis that there are no excess returns to
29 The MIT Center for Coordination Science and International Financial Services Research Center jointly
sponsored a Workshop on IT and Productivity which was held in December, 1992.
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COMPUTER CAPITAL cannot be rejected if we assume that there are significant unmeasured
costs to computer spending.
There are a number of other directions in which this work could be extended. In the
current formulation, it is difficult to make direct comparisons between firms in different
industries because the definitions of "output" vary. An alternative dependent variable
which can be estimated using production functions is value added. This approach should
treat firms in a more comparable way, allowing greater precision in estimating the effects of
IS spending, and therefore enabling more complex production function relationships to be
examined. It would also be worthwhile to investigate the role of other variables, such as
research and development expenditures, which might be associated with the advancement
of technology in general, and IT in particular. One recent study (Dunne, 1993) suggested
that firms which invest heavily in R&D are also most innovative in their use of IT.
Although our approach allowed us to infer the value created by intangibles like product
variety by looking at changes in the revenues at the firm level, more direct approaches
might also be promising. For instance, other variables can be collected to see whether
computer productivity is systematically related to characteristics such as variety of product
line, or the average defect rate in their output.
Finally, the type of extension which is likely to have the greatest impact on practice is
further analysis of the factors which differentiate firms with high returns to IT from low
performers. For instance, is the current "downsizing" of firms leading to higher IT
productivity? Are the firms that have undertaken substantial "reengineering efforts" also
the ones with the highest returns? Since this study has presented evidence that the
computer "productivity paradox" is a thing of the past, it seems appropriate that the next
round of work should focus on identifying the strategies which have led to large IT
productivity.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Gross Marginal Product
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Figure 2: Changes in IT Inputs over Time
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Figure 3: Gross Marginal Product of Computer Capital over Time
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Figure 4: Gross Marginal Product of Computer Capital by Sector
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Non-Dur. Durable Trans. & Other
Mining Mfr. Mfr. Utilities Trade Service
Coefficient -.0286 .0122* .0348*** .00227 .0129 .0153
Std. Error (.0218) (.00691) (.00678) (.0111) (.00921) (.0354)
N (total) 28 414 360 171 123 25
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<05, * - p<.l, standard errors in parenthesis
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Figure 5: Gross Marginal Product for Computer Capital with different PC value
assumptions
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Table 1: Data Sources, Construction Procedures, and Deflators
Series Source Construction Procedure Deflator
Computer IDG "Market Value of Central Deflator for Computer Systems
Capital Survey Processors" converted to constant (Gordon, 1993). Extended through
1987 dollars, plus the total number 1991 at a constant rate.
of PCs and terminals multiplied by
an average value of a PC/terminal,
also converted to constant 1987
dollars.
Non- Compustat Total Property, Plant and GDP Implicit Deflator for Fixed
Computer Equipment Investment converted to Investment (Council of Economic
Capital constant 1987 dollars. Adjusted Advisors, 1992).
for retirements using Winfrey S-3
Table (10 year service life) and
aggregated to create capital stock.
Computer capital as calculated
above was subtracted from this
result.
IS Staff IDG Total IS Budget times percentage of Index of Total Compensation Cost
Survey IS Budget (by company) devoted to (Private Sector) (Council of
labor expense. Converted to Economic Advisors, 1992).
constant 1987 dollars.
Non-IS Compustat Total Labor, Materials and other Producer Price Index for
Labor and non-interest expenses converted to Intermediate Materials, Supplies and
Expense constant 1987 dollars. IS labor as Components (Council of Economic
calculated above was subtracted Advisors, 1992).
from this result.
Output Compustat Total sales converted to constant Industry Specific Deflators from
1987 dollars. Gross Output and Related Series by
Industry, BEA (1977-89) where
available (about 80% coverage) -
extrapolated for 1991 assuming
average inflation rate from previous
five years. Otherwise, sector level
Producer Price Index for
Intermediate Materials Supplies and
Components (Gorman, 1992).
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Table 2a: Summary Statistics
Table 2b. Sample Composition relative to Fortune 500 Population
Sample Statistics - Average over all points
(Constant 1987 Dollars)
Total $
(Annual As a % of Per Firm
Average) Output Average
Output $1,661Bn 100% $7.41 Bn
Computer Capital (stock) $34.7 Bn 2.09% $155 MM
Non-Computer Capital (stock) $1,614 Bn 97.2% $7.20 Bn
IS Budget (flow) $27.1 Bn 1.63% $121 MM
IS Staff (flow) $11.3 Bn 0.68% $50.4 MM
Non-IS Labor and Expenses (flow) $1,384 Bn 83.3% $6.17 Bn
Avg. Number of Companies per 224 224 224
Year
Total Observations 1121 1121 1121
Sample Composition
Number of firms
Fortune 500 Fortune 500
Manufacturing Service Other
1991 Sample Breakdown
Top Half Fortune 500 157 61
Lower Half Fortune 500 39 22
Total . 196 83 14
All Fortune 500 Firms in Compustat
Top Half Fortune 500 240 228
Lower Half Fortune 500 226 196 n.a.
Total 466 424
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Table 3: Base Regressions - Coefficient Estimates and Implied Gross Rates of Return
All parameters (except year dummy) constrained to be equal across years.
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.l, standard errors in parenthesis
Table 4: Split Sample Regression Results - Mainframes as a percentage of total Computer
Capital
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.1, standard errors in parenthesis
1 - Ordering by 2 tests of return differences. P-value shown represents null hypothesis of
equality across groups.
Parameter Coefficients Marginal
Product
31 (Computer Capital) .0169*** 81.0%(.00431)
[2 (Non-computer Capital) .0608*** 6.26%(.00466)
03 (IS Staff) .00526)178*** 2.62(.00526)
04 (Other Labor & Exp.) .883*** 1.07
(.00724)
Dummy Variables Year*** &
Sector***
R 2 (1991) 97.5%
N (1991) 293
N (total) 1121
Coefficient Estimates and Marginal Product for Computer Capital
Grouping based on mainframes as a percentage of total Computer Capital
Statistical
Sample Split . Highest Middle Lowest Ordering
Elasticity Estimate (B1) .0113** .0159*** .0117**
Standard Error (.00500) (.00528) (.00521) Med>(High,Low)
Marginal Product (MPc) 49.1% 79.5% 58.2% (p<.03)
Mean % Mainframes 74% 54% 34%
Group Std. Dev. 9% 5% 8%
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Table 5: Specification Test - Comparison of OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares
All parameters (except year dummy) constrained to be equal across years.
Key: *** - p<.01, ** - p<.05, * - p<.l, standard errors are in parentheses
Note: OLS estimates are for sample of same firms as were available for 2SLS regression
(n=702).
OLS 2SLS
Parameter Estimates Estimates
31 (Computer Capital) .0284*** .0435***
(.00723) (.0126)
32 (Non-computer Capital) .0489*** .0481***
(.00668) (.00702)
03 (IS Staff) .0191*** .00727
(.00795) (.0116)
[4 (Non-IS Labor & Exp.) .881*** .879***
(.0113) (.0125)
Dummy Variables Year*** & Year*** &
Sector*** Sector***
R 2 98.3% 98.3%
N (total) 702 702
Hausman Test Results (instruments are lagged independent variables):I 2 (4) = 6.40, (p<.17) - cannot reject exogeneity
Page 36
Evidence on the Returns IS
Table 6: X2 Tests for Differences in Marginal Product between Computer Capital and
Other Capital
A significant test indicates that the return on computer capital is greater than the return on
other capital.
Return Difference Tests
Computer Capital vs. Other
Capital Return Z2 Statistic Significance
Gross Return 81% 15.5 <.00 1
Net - 7 Year Service Life 67% 10.6 p<.01
Net - 3 Year Service Life 48% 5.5 p<.02
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Table 7: Summary of Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis Description of Test (alternative hypothesis) Test Statistic
H1 Positive marginal product for COMPUTER CAPITAL t=3.92, p<.01
H1 Positive marginal product for IS STAFF t=3.38, p<.01
H1 Simultaneous test for positive marginal product for X2 (2)=43.9, p<.01
COMPUTER CAPITAL and IS STAFF
H2 Positive net marginal product for COMPUTER CAPITAL t=3.24, p<.01
(see table 6), cost @ 14% (7-year average life)
H2 Positive net marginal product for COMPUTER CAPITAL t=2.32, p<.05
(see table 6), cost @ 33% (3-year average life)
H2 Positive net marginal product for IS STAFF X 2 (1)=4.4, p<.05
H2 Marginal product of COMPUTER CAPITAL exceeds see table 6
marginal product of OTHER CAPITAL
H2 Marginal product of IS STAFF exceeds marginal product of X2 (1)4.0, p<.05
OTHER LABOR AND EXPENSE
Extension of Marginal Product of COMPUTER CAPITAL changes across X2 (4)=1 1.2, p<.02
H1 time
Extension of Marginal Product of COMPUTER CAPITAL varies across %2(4)=6.6, p<.2
H1 sectors
Extension of Marginal Product varies by mainframes as a percentage of 2(2)=6.9, p<.03
H 1 total COMPUTER CAPITAL
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